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I. INTRODUCTION
The accused is charged with homicide. The indictment alleges that the ac-
cused committed the murder in early 1990. During the government's case-in-
chief at trial, the prosecutor calls a witness. The witness begins describing a
killing which the accused supposedly committed in 1989. The defense strenu-
ously objects that the witness's testimony is "nothing more than blatantly inad-
missible evidence of the accused's general bad character." However, at sidebar
the prosecutor makes an offer of proof that the 1989 killing was perpetrated
with "exactly the same modus operandi as the 1990 murder." Given this state
of the record, how should the trial judge rule on the defense objection?
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),' which is in effect in over thirty states as
well as federal practice,' supplies the answer to the question. On the one hand,
the first sentence of Rule 404(b) forbids the judge from admitting the evidence
as circumstantial proof of the accused's conduct on the alleged occasion in
1990. That sentence provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith."3 Figure 1 depicts the theory of admissibility banned by
the first sentence of the rule.4 Thus, the prosecutor cannot offer the witness's
testimony about the 1989 incident to prove the accused's disposition toward
murder and, in turn, use the accused's antisocial disposition as evidence that the
accused committed the alleged 1990 murder.
On the other hand, the second sentence of Rule 404(b) permits the judge
to admit the evidence when it is relevant on a noncharacter theory. That sen-
tence reads that uncharged misconduct evidence "may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
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Figure 1
ITEM OF INTERMEDIATE ULTIMATE
EVIDENCE INFERENCE - INFERENCE
THE ACCUSED'S THE ACCUSED'S THE ACCUSED'S
UNCHARGED ACT SUBJECTIVE, CONDUCT IN
PERSONAL CONFORMITY
CHARACTER, WITH HIS OR
DISPOSITION HER CHARACTER
OR PROPENSITY ON THE CHARGED
OCCASION
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."5 In our hypotheti-
cal case, the trial judge could allow the prosecutor to introduce the 1989 inci-
dent to establish the accused's identity as the perpetrator of the 1990 killing. If
the two killings were committed with the identical, unique modus operandi, the
uncharged incident is logically relevant to prove the accused's identity as the
perpetrator of the charged crime without relying on a verboten character infer-
ence.6 Hence, the judge could properly admit the testimony with a limiting in-
struction7 identifying the permissible and impermissible uses of the evidence.
The admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence is the single most im-
portant issue in contemporary criminal evidence law.' The issue has figured im-
portantly in several of the most celebrated criminal trials of our time. Although
Wayne Williams was formally charged with the murders of only Nathaniel Ca-
ter and Jimmy Ray Payne, the Georgia trial judge permitted the prosecutor to
introduce evidence about ten other killings.9 The national media made the pros-
ecution's hair and fiber evidence the centerpiece of the trial, but that evidence
was merely a means to the end of tying all twelve killings together. Similarly,
uncharged misconduct evidence was a vital part of the prosecution's case
against Claus von Bulow; the prosecution presented testimony about the ac-
cused's affair with Mrs. Isles on the theory that the affair supplied the motive
for the accused's attempt to kill his millionairess wife."
5. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
6. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, §§ 3:10-:14.
7. FED. R. EvID. 105.
8. lmwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct: One of the Most Misunderstood Issues in Criminal Evidence, 1
CRIM. JusT. 6, 7 (1986).
9. Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983).
10. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, § 1:01, at 2.
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The numbers confirm the importance of the issue of uncharged misconduct
evidence.1 1 Rule 404(b) has generated more published opinions than any other
subsection of the Federal Rules. 2 In many jurisdictions, alleged errors in the
admission of uncharged misconduct evidence are the most common ground for
appeal in criminal cases.13 In some jurisdictions, errors in the introduction of
uncharged misconduct are the most frequent basis for reversal in criminal
cases.
1 4
Recent years have witnessed several frontal assaults on the first prong of
the uncharged misconduct doctrine, prohibiting the prosecutor from offering ev-
idence of an accused's uncharged crimes on a character theory as circumstantial
proof of conduct. Some commentators have argued that the distinction between
character and noncharacter theories of relevance is illusory; according to this
argument, even the purportedly noncharacter theories entail assumptions about
the accused's tendencies and disposition." Alternatively, other commentators
have contended that an accused's uncharged crimes can be so highly probative
even on a character theory that it would be irrational to exclude them. In one
jurisdiction, prosecutors have argued that a proposition adopted by the state
electorate has the effect of abolishing the general ban on evidence of an ac-
cused's bad character. 17
To date, the direct attacks on the character evidence prohibition have been
unsuccessful. The American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's Com-
mittee on Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence recently reaffirmed the
distinction between character and noncharacter theories of logical relevance.' 8
For their part, the courts have uniformly declined the invitation to overturn the
character evidence prohibition. 9
11. Imwinkelried, The Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of the Defendant's Uncharged Crimes: A Micro-
cosm of the Flaws in the Uncharged Misconduct Doctrine, 50 Mo. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).
12. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 404[08], at 404-56 (1989); S. SALTZBURG, L.
SCHINASI & D. SCHLUETER, MIuTARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 361 (2d ed. 1986) ("heavily litigated in
federal and military courts").
13. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRp-tAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5239, at 427 (1978).
14. Evidence-The Emotional Propensity Exception: State v. Treadaway 1978 Apiz. ST. LJ. 153, 156 n.29.
15. See generally Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66
IowA L REV. 777 (1981).
16. Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion. Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 845, 883, 890 (1982). See also Hutton, Commentary: Prior Bad Acts Evidence in Cases of Sexual
Contact With a Child, 34 S.D. L REV. 604 (1989) (urging the recognition of a limited sexual offender exception
to the general character evidence prohibition in child sexual abuse prosecutions).
17. In 1982, the California electorate adopted Proposition 8, amending the state constitution. Mendez, Cali-
fornia's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological
Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003 (1984). California prosecutors have argued that Proposition 8 overturns the
character evidence prohibition in that state. E.g., People v. Jordan, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 249 Cal. Rptr. 269
(1988); People v. Nible, 200 Cal. App. 3d 838, 846 n.5, 247 Cal. Rptr. 396, 400 n.5 (1988); People v. Perkins,
159 Cal. App. 3d 646, 205 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1984).
18. ABA Comm. On Rules of Crim. Proc. & Evid., Crim. Just. Sect., Federal Rules of Evidence: A Fresh
Review and Evaluation 28 (1987) ("a line can be drawn based on whether or not the proofs line of reasoning
seeks to make use of the particular propensity known as 'character' ").
19. Frank v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 3d 632, 770 P.2d 1119, 257 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1989); People v. Perkins,
159 Cal. App. 3d 646, 205 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1984); Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 449 n.6, 683 P.2d
699, 704 n.6, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 705 n.6 (1984).
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However, the advocates of the traditional ban on character evidence should
take little solace from the failure of the direct attacks on the ban. Notwith-
standing the failure of the direct attacks, the ban is imperiled. The threat to the
ban arises from two emerging lines of case law governing the use of an ac-
cused's uncharged misconduct to prove the accused's mens rea. The use of the
defendant's other crimes to prove intent is already the most widely used basis
for admitting uncharged misconduct evidence.2" These new lines of authority,
however, threaten to expand the admissibility of uncharged misconduct to es-
tablish mens rea to the point that this use of the evidence may substantially
undermine the character evidence prohibition.
The purpose of this article is to describe and critique these two lines of
authority. Section II of the article discusses one line, namely, the case law ad-
vancing the proposition that the first sentence in Rule 404(b) is automatically
inapplicable whenever the prosecutor offers uncharged misconduct to support an
ultimate inference of mental intent rather than physical conduct. The next sec-
tion of the article analyzes the second line of authority. That line includes the
decisions urging that under the doctrine of objective chances, the prosecutor can
routinely offer uncharged misconduct on a noncharacter theory to prove intent.
Both lines of authority are spurious, and both represent grave threats to the
continued viability of the character evidence prohibition.
II. THE DOCTRINE THAT THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE PROHIBITION IS
INAPPLICABLE WHEN THE PROSECUTOR OFFERS THE ACCUSED'S UNCHARGED
MISCONDUCT TO ESTABLISH THE ULTIMATE INFERENCE OF THE ACCUSED'S
MENS REA
The first sentence of Rule 404(b) embodies the character evidence prohibi-
tion. In pertinent part, the first sentence of Rule 404(b) precludes a prosecutor
from introducing evidence of an accused's other crimes "to prove the [accused's
bad] character . . . in order to show action in conformity therewith."'" On its
face, the wording of the rule suggests that the rule comes into play only when
the prosecutor offers the uncharged misconduct to support an ultimate inference
of conduct.2 2 Suppose that in a given case, the prosecutor offers testimony about
the accused's uncharged misconduct to support the ultimate inference that the
accused committed the charged offense with the requisite mens rea. Figure 2
depicts the prosecutor's theory of admissibility. Given the wording of the first
sentence of Rule 404(b), the prohibition is arguably inapplicable whenever the
prosecutor proposes relying on this theory of admissibility. The prosecutor will
argue that an inference of mens rea differs from an inference of action or
conduct.23
20. 22 C. WRIor & K. GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 5242; Reed, The Development of the Propensity Rule In
Federal Criminal Causes 1840-1975, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 299, 306 (1982).
21. FED. R. EvIv. 404(b).
22. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 5242, at 488; Myers, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in
Child Abuse Litigation, 1988 UTAH L. Rav. 479, 524-25; Teitelbaum & Hertz, Evidence II: Evidence of Other
Crimes as Proof of Intent, 13 N.M. L. REv. 423, 431 (1983).
23. See authorities cited in supra note 22.
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Figure 2
ITEM OF INTERMEDIATE ULTIMATE
EVIDENCE - INFERENCE = INFERENCE
THE ACCUSED'S THE ACCUSED'S THE ACCUSED'S
UNCHARGED ACT TENDENCY TO FORMATION OF THE
FORM A CERTAIN MENS REA ON THE
MENS REA CHARGED
DISPOSITION HER CHARACTER
OCCASION
The prosecutor's argument is not only plausible; there is a wealth of case
law embracing the argument.14 Indeed, it may currently be the prevailing view
that the character evidence prohibition codified in Rule 404(b) is inapposite
when the prosecutor's ultimate purpose is proving the accused's mens rea.23 The
California equivalent of Rule 404(b) is Evidence Code Sec. 1101(b).1 6 The Fed-
eral Advisory Committee used § 1101(b) as one of its models in drafting Rule
404(b).2 7 Section 1101(b) forbids the prosecution from offering uncharged mis-
conduct evidence to support an ultimate inference of "conduct on a specified
occasion. 12 8 In a recent case, the California Supreme Court emphasized that §
1101(b) forbids the prosecutor from introducing the accused's uncharged mis-
conduct "only 'when offered to prove [defendant's] conduct on a specified occa-
sion.' " 9 In that case, the court held that the character evidence prohibition in
§ 1101(b) was inapplicable because "[t]he prosecutor offered the evidence to
prove defendant's state of mind ... rather than defendant's conduct on any
particular occasion." 30 Other decisions have similarly permitted prosecutors to
argue that if an accused entertained the required mens rea during a similar,
uncharged incident, "he probably harbor[ed] the same intent" at the time of
the charged offense.3'
This doctrine is a dangerous one threatening to emasculate the character
evidence prohibition. 2 Several courts3 have warned that this doctrine has the
potential to swallow up the character evidence prohibition. Admittedly, that
24. Myers, supra note 22, at 531. See also United States v. Weddell, 890 F.2d 106, 107-08 (8th Cir.
1989)("Where intent is an element of the crime charged, evidence of other acts tending to establish that element
is generally admissible").
25. Myers, supra note 22, at 531.
26. CAL EvID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1990).
27. Adv. Comm. Note, FED. R. EvID. 404(b). The note twice refers to the California Law Revision Commis-
sion commentary to the proposed statute which ultimately became Evidence Code § 1101(b).
28. CAt. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1990).
29. People v. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d 1046, 1096, 774 P.2d 659, 688, 259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 659 (1989) (emphasis
in the original).
30. Id.
31. People v. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d 975, 990-91, 750 P.2d 794, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905, cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 248
(1988).
32. Teitelbaum & Hertz, supra note 22, at 431.
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warning is somewhat overstated. Even if we posit that the prohibition in the first
sentence of Rule 404(b) is inapplicable when uncharged misconduct is used to
prove mens rea, evidence of the accused's uncharged misconduct would not be-
come automatically admissible in every prosecution; the prosecutor would still
have to convince the judge that the uncharged incident is similar enough to the
charged offense to satisfy the requirement of logical relevance under Rule 401."
However, there is a large element of truth in the warning; the acceptance of the
doctrine would represent a major inroad on the character evidence prohibition.
Intent is an element of every true crime.3 5 Accepting the premise that the char-
acter evidence prohibition is inapplicable to evidence offered to establish mens
rea, the courts could rationalize admitting evidence of any similar uncharged
crimes as a matter of course.
In the final analysis, however, the doctrine is not only dangerous; more
importantly, the doctrine is unsound. A careful analysis of the theory of admis-
sibility depicted in Figure 2 dictates the conclusion that the theory implicates
the core concerns of the character evidence prohibition. In principle, the courts
should treat the theory as impermissible character reasoning.
A. The Policy Rationales for the Character Evidence Prohibition
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the forbidder character theory of relevance en-
tails two inferences. Each inference presents a distinct probative danger, and
the combination of probative dangers constitutes the policy justification for the
character evidence prohibition. 6
The first inferential step in character reasoning is determining the type of
person the accused is. This step requires the jury to focus on the accused's dis-
position or propensity. The jurors must ask themselves: What type of person is
the accused? Is she a law-abiding, moral person or a law-breaking, immoral
individual? At a conscious level, the jurors must dwell on the accused's personal
character.
37
While consciously deciding whether to infer the accused's subjective bad
character from the accused's uncharged crimes, at a subconscious level the ju-
rors may be tempted to punish the accused for the other crimes.38 The tempta-
tion may be especially acute when the testimony indicates that the accused has
not as of yet been convicted of and punished for the uncharged crime.39 The
uncharged misconduct evidence may create the impression that to date, the ac-
33. Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Oppon, 863 F.2d 141,
149 (1st Cir. 1988) (Coffin, J., concurring). See also Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Inno-
cence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY LJ. 135, 152-53 (1989).
34. FED. R. EVID. 401.
35. Thompson v. United States, supra note 33; Ordover, supra note 33, at 152; Comment, Admission of
Evidence of Other Misconduct in Washington to Prove Intent or Absence of Mistake or Accident: The Logical
Inconsistencies of Evidence Rule 404(b), 61 WAsm. L. REV. 1213, 1221 (1986).
36. E. IMWINKELPIED. supra note 4, § 2:18.
37. Turcott, Similar Fact Evidence: The Boardman Legacy, 21 CalM. L.Q. 43, 46, 48, 54, 56 (1978-79).
38. Johnson, The Admissibility of Extraneous Offenses in Texas Criminal Cases, 14 S. TEX. LJ. 69, 78
(1972-73).
39. Williams, The Problem of Similar Fact Evidence, 5 DALtousm LJ. 281, 299-300 (1979).
[Vol. 51:575
PROVING MENS PEA
cused has unjustly escaped punishment for the uncharged misdeeds.'0 The ju-
rors may be tempted to rectify that injustice by punishing the accused now for
the uncharged crimes--even though they have a reasonable doubt about the
accused's guilt of the charged offense.""
If the jury convicted the accused for that reason, the basis of the conviction
would be improper. Under our accusatory criminal justice system, it is axio-
matic that the accused need answer only for the crime she is currently charged
with. 2 The Supreme Court has held that the eighth amendment ban on cruel
and unusual punishment precludes a state from criminalizing a personal status
such as drug addiction.'3 If the uncharged misconduct evidence prompts the
jury to convict to punish the accused for his uncharged crimes, in effect the jury
has punished the accused for his status as a recidivist. When the admission of
technically relevant evidence would realistically create the risk that the jury will
decide the case on an improper basis, the risk is a probative danger which may
warrant the exclusion of the evidence.4 4 In their Note to Federal Rule 403, the
Advisory Committee states that Rule 403 authorizes the trial judge to exclude
marginally relevant evidence which "suggest[s] decision on an improper basis
"45
Like the initial inferential step in character reasoning, the second step
poses a significant probative danger. Just as the jurors wrongly decide" the case
if they rest their verdict on an improper basis, they may be guilty of misdecision
if they overestimate the probative value of a particular item of evidence.' 7 The
jurors can commit inferential error by ascribing undue weight to the item.4
This possibility of inferential error materializes when a jury engages in the sec-
ond step in character reasoning.
On the one hand, the available psychological studies indicate that once
they have characterized the accused's general character, the jurors are likely to
attach great weight to that characterization in determining whether the accused
acted "in character" on the occasion of the charged offense. 4" Even when they
have only fragmentary data about an individual, many laypersons tend to form
oversimplified perceptions of the individual's character.5 Thus, having con-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials, 50
U. CiH. L. REV. 713, 731 (1981); State v. Ellis: The Other Wrongful Acts Rule, Survey of Nebraska
Law-Evidence, 15 CREIGrrTO L. REV. 281, 284 (1981).
43. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence
After Adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CiH. L. Rav. 113, 163-69 (1984).
44. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can
Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REv. 879, 889 (1988).
45. Adv. Comm. Note, FED. R. EViD. 403.
46. 6 J. BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENrHAm 105-09 (J. Bowring ed. 1962).
47. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 59, 83
(1984).
48. Id. at 90; Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1021, 1030-31 (1977).
49. Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 758, 776 (1975).
50. Munday, Stepping Beyond the Bounds of Credibility: The Application of Section 1)(iH) of the Criminal
Evidence Act 1898, CRiM. L. REV. 511, 513 (1986) ("Psychologists have reported for several decades on the
tendency of people to judge one another on the basis of one outstanding 'good' or 'bad' characteristic. This is
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eluded that the accused is disposed to criminal misconduct, the jurors may
ascribe great significance to that conclusion in deciding whether the accused
committed the charged crime.
On the other hand, the empirical studies indicate that the general construct
of character is a relatively poor predictor of a person's conduct on a given occa-
sion.5 ' At one time, the trait theory, championed by Gordon Allport, was quite
popular.52 That theory viewed a person's general character as a reliable predic-
tor of conduct across widely differing situations. However, in the 1960's Walter
Mischel introduced the competing theory of specificity or situationism.5 3 Mis-
chel attacked the trait theory by pointing to studies showing a lack of cross-
situational consistency. Those studies demonstrated that "moral conduct in one
situation is not highly correlated with moral conduct in another.""4 In light of
the available studies, we can have little confidence in the construct of character
as a predictor of conduct. 5  Although some psychologists still subscribe to a
modified version of the trait theory,56 there is considerable evidence discrediting
the popular faith in the predictive value of a person's general character.57 Situa-
tional factors are often more determinant of human behavior.58 The upshot is
that the jurors may give character far more weight than it deserves.59
As previously stated, the admission of evidence of an accused's uncharged
crimes creates the probative danger that the jurors will convict despite a reason-
able doubt about the accused's guilt of the charged offense. Combined with that
danger, the risk of the jurors' overestimation of the probative value of the ac-
cused's bad character furnishes the rationale for the character evidence prohibi-
tion prescribed by the first sentence of Rule 404(b).
B. The Applicability of the Policy Rationales to the Prosecution's Use of the
Accused's Uncharged Misconduct to Prove the Accused's Mens Rea
To be sure, the theory of relevance depicted in Figure 2 differs superficially
from the forbidden theory depicted in Figure 1. However, on closer scrutiny, it
popularly known as the 'halo effect.' In essence, it represents our propensity to oversimplify our perception of
others' personalities and to take for the whole that portion of someone else's personality which happens to be
visible to us.. . . This tendency to exaggerate the representativeness of particular conduct is especially dangerous
in the case of the misconduct and bad character of the accused .... ").
51. See generally Mendez, supra note 17; Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L
Rav. 334, 351-53 (1979).
52. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58
U. COLO. L. Rav. 1, 26 (1986-87).
53. Id. at 27.
54. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Burton, Generality of Honesty Reconsid-
ered, 70 PSYCHOLOGY Rav. 481 (1963)).
55. 22 C. W1IGHT & K GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 5239.
56. Crump, How Should We Treat Character Evidence Offered to Prove Conduct?, 58 U. COLO. L Ray.
279, 283 (1987). For some persons, character appears to be a good predictor of behavior in specific situations.
Sherman & Fazio, Parallels Between Attitudes and Traits as Predictors of Behavior, 51 J. PERSONAUTY 308,
309, 312 (1983).
57. Mischel, Alternatives in the Pursuit of the Predictability and Consistency of Persons: Stable Data That
Yield Unstable Interpretation, 51 J. PERSONALiTY 578, 584-85 (1983).
58. Lawson, supra note 49, at 778-85.
59. Elliott, The Young Person's Guide to Similar Fact EvIdence-I, 1983 CRim. L Rav. 284, 287.
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becomes clear that the two theories are indistinguishable in terms of the perti-
nent policy considerations. The theory depicted in Figure 2 poses both of the
probative dangers inspiring the character evidence prohibition.
At the outset, it is evident that when the prosecutor relies on the theory
depicted in Figure 2, there is a grave risk that the jurors will be tempted to
return a guilty verdict resting on an improper basis. Evidence of the accused's
uncharged misconduct is potentially prejudicial because the jurors may perceive
the uncharged conduct as immorale° and consequently react adversely to the
accused.61 For the most part, it is the accused's wrongful intent which gives the
conduct its perceived immoral quality. As Shakespeare wrote, "[T]here is noth-
ing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.' ' 62 When a writer wants' to
express the thought that a person has a criminal disposition, the writer fre-
quently describes the person as a "criminal mind" 63--rather than a criminal
arm or leg. Suppose that the jury concludes that the accused has a warped mind
inclined to criminal intent. That conclusion can cause the jurors to experience
the very type of revulsion which the character evidence prohibition is designed
to guard against. As Judge Goldberg has noted, the "character" referred to in
Rule 404(b) is "largely a concept of a person's psychological bent or frame of
mind ... .6
Compounding the probative danger, the theory set out in Figure 2 also
poses the second probative danger underlying the prohibition: the risk that the
jury will overestimate the probative worth of the evidence.
The theory certainly requires the jury to draw an intermediate inference as
to the accused's disposition or tendency to form a particular mens rea. The
charged offense occurred at one time and place while the uncharged crime ordi-
narily occurs at a different time and place. To bridge the temporal and spatial
gap between the two incidents, 5 the prosecutor must assume the accused's pro-
pensity to entertain the same intent in similar situations.6 That assumption is
the inescapable link between the charged and uncharged crimes.67 The trier of
fact can reason from the starting point of the uncharged crime to a conclusion
60. See generally Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66
IOWA L. REv. 777 (1981).
61. Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges
Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. R V. 1147, 1162 (although the persons sur-
veyed frequently differed in their evaluation of the prejudicial character of various items of evidence, "the greatest
agreement. . . is found in connection with evidence suggesting immoral conduct by the defendant .
62. HAMLET, Act II, Sc. 2, Line 259.
63. See generally P. RocHt, THE CRIMINAL MINI (1958); DeBenedictis, Criminal Minds, 76 A.B.A.J. 30
(Jan. 1990).
64. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 921 (5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 920 (1979); Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rule 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a),
38 EMoRY LJ. 135, 166 (1989).
65. Ordover, supra note 64, at 158.
66. Myers, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child Abuse Litigation, 1988 UTAH L. RaV. 479, 526.
67. United States v. Rubio-Estrada, 857 F.2d 845, 853 (1st Cir. 1988) (Torruella, J., dissenting); Ordover,
supra note 64, at 160.
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about the mens rea of the charged crime only through an intermediate assump-
tion about the accused's character or propensity.6
8
The reliance on an assumption about a person's propensity or tendency to
form the same intent creates the possibility that the jury will overvalue the un-
charged misconduct evidence. If the only question were the accused's physical
response, to some extent the resolution of the question would be reducible to the
application of the laws of chemistry and physics. The application of the laws of
the physical sciences can help predict the accused's physical reaction. It is the
mental component of the accused's conduct which introduces the element of
unpredictability. American criminal law operates on the assumption that the
typical person possesses cognitive and volitional capacities. 69 The variety of
ways in which the person can exercise those capacities makes it difficult to fore-
cast the person's mental state at any given time. Even if the accused entertained
a certain intent during a similar, uncharged incident, the accused may not have
formed that intent on the charged occasion. The risk of overestimation exists
because the response to a situation includes a variable mental component.
Despite the seeming differences between the theories depicted in Figures 1
and 2, the theories are indistinguishable in policy.70 Both theories necessitate an
intermediate assumption about the accused's propensity or tendency. Both theo-
ries create a risk of prejudice to the accused; in attempting to decide at a con-
scious level whether the accused has a tendency to entertain a certain mens rea,
the jurors may subconsciously conclude that the accused is a repulsive, immoral
individual-the type of person who should be incarcerated even if there is a
reasonable doubt of his guilt of the charged offense. Finally, in applying both
theories, the jury can easily overestimate the probative value of the uncharged
misconduct evidence. Thus, whether the question arises at common lawv71 or
under Federal Rule 404(b),72 the court should hold that the theory depicted in
Figure 2 violates the character evidence prohibition.7 3 The prohibition applies
whether the ultimate inference is the physical act of pulling a trigger or the
mental act of forming an intent to kill.74
68. Teitelbaum & Hertz, supra note 22, at 427, 429. See United States v. Logan, 18 M.J. 606, (A.F.C.M.R.
1984) (the prosecution argued "that if the accused stole items not charged it could be inferred that he had the
requisite intent with regards to the items charged." The court held that the prosecution's argument was merely an
attempt to demonstrate that "the accused is a 'bad man' .... ).
69. W. LAFAVa & A. ScOrr, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 3.1, 3.4, 3.5, 4.2 (2d ed. 1986); R. PaRKISS & R. BOYC,
CRIMINAL LAW 826-35, 950-75 (3d ed. 1982).
70. Teiltelbaum & Hertz, supra note 22, at 427.
71.
Even Professor Julius Stone, the staunchest supporter of the inclusionary rule, condemns this sort of rea-
soning as a perversion of the rule. Where the prior crime evidence is offered to prove the defendant's
'tendency' or 'mental attitude (intent) along that particular line of crime,' we are admitting evidence
'precisely for the reason that the original rule excluded it'.
Ordover, supra note 64, at 158 (emphasis in original).
72. Comment, supra note 35, at 1232 ("This reasoning fails to comport with the plain language of ER
404(b)").
73. Judge Toruella has persuasively argued for this holding in a series of cases. United States v. Garcia-Rosa,
876 F.2d 209, 221 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Cortijo-Diaz, 875 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v.
Rubio-Estrada, 857 F.2d 845, 853 (1st Cir. 1988) (Toruella, J., dissenting).
74. E. IMWINKaLRIED, supra note 4, § 2:18, at 2-50.
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III. THE DOCTRINE THAT THE PROSECUTOR MAY ROUTINELY OFFER
EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED'S UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT TO PROVE INTENT
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF OBJECTIVE CHANCES WITHOUT VIOLATING THE
CHARACTER EVIDENCE PROHIBITION
Section II demonstrated that the character evidence prohibition applies
even when the prosecutor offers the testimony about the accused's other crimes
to establish an ultimate inference of mens rea. For that reason, when the gov-
ernment contemplates offering uncharged misconduct to prove mens rea, it is
incumbent on the prosecutor to articulate a tenable noncharacter theory of logi-
cal relevance.
In some fact situations the prosecutor can readily develop a valid,
noncharacter theory of admissibility. Assume, for instance, that the accused is
charged with knowing receipt of stolen goods from A on September 1, 1990.
The prosecutor has evidence that on March 1, 1990 under very suspicious cir-
cumstances, the accused received other stolen property from A: the accused met
A in an alley at 2:00 a.m., A demanded that the accused pay in $1.00 bills, and
the identification numbers on the items of personalty had been defaced. In this
case, the prosecutor may offer the testimony about the March 1st incident with-
out relying on any inference about the accused's general, bad character.7 5 The
March 1st incident should have placed the accused on notice that A is a fence
for stolen property, and the jury may make the common sense inference that the
accused's knowledge of A's status as a fence continued until September 1st.
In other cases, however, it is more difficult to determine whether the prose-
cutor has developed a legitimate noncharacter theory of relevance--or whether
the prosecutor is merely endeavoring to cloak an illicit character theory. In a
growing number of cases, prosecutors are citing the doctrine of objective
chances as their theory of noncharacter relevance.7 6 In the main, the courts
have approved of prosecutors' invocations of the doctrine.7 However, several
commentators have argued that prosecutors are now smuggling inadmissible
bad character evidence into the record under the guise of invoking the doctrine
of objective chances.7 8 The purpose of this section of the article is to assess that
argument. The first part of this section describes the doctrine of chances and
analyzes the use of the doctrine to prove the actus reus in the case. The next
part of this section evaluates the more controversial application of the doctrine,
namely, its use to establish mens rea.
75. Id. at §§ 5:21-:28.
76. Comment, supra note 35, at 1225, 1227, 1233.
77. E.g., United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974); State v.
Allen, 301 Or. 569, 725 P.2d 331 (1986). See also People v. Spoto, No. 88 SC 611 (Colo., July 9, 1990)
(WESTLAW, States library, Colorado file).
78. Ordover, supra note 64, at 168; Orfinger, Battered Child Syndrome: Evidence of Prior Acts in Disguise,
41 U. F.A. L. REV. 345, 362, 366 (1989).
1990]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
A. The Use of the Doctrine of Chances to Prove the Actus Reus
In the last decade, our society has come to the distressing realization that
there is extensive child abuse in the United States.7 9 Throughout the United
States, prosecutors are making a more determined effort to convict child abus-
ers.80 There may be indisputable medical evidence that the alleged victim has
suffered a fracture or subdural hematoma.81 However, the accused often de-
fends on the theory that the child sustained the injury accidentally. For exam-
ple, the accused might contend that the child incurred the injury by falling off a
swing set or down a flight of stairs. In these cases, the prosecutor's primary
problem of proof is establishing an actus retis-a social loss or harm82 caused
by human agency. 83 At trial, the principal challenge facing the prosecution will
be convincing the jury that the child's injury resulted from the intervention of
another human being.84 To meet that challenge, prosecutors frequently rely on
the doctrine of chances.
United States v. Woods85 is the paradigmatic case.86 In Woods, the ac-
cused stood trial for infanticide. The victim had died of cyanosis. The accused
claimed that the suffocation was accidental. To rebut the accused's claim, the
prosecutor offered evidence that over a twenty-five year period, children in the
accused's custody had experienced twenty cyanotic episodes.87 The defense ob-
jected to the admission of the testimony on the ground that the testimony
amounted to impermissible evidence of the accused's bad character.88 However,
the prosecution rejoined that the testimony was relevant on a noncharacter the-
ory, that is, the doctrine of chances.89
Figure 3 depicts the theory of logical relvance underlying the doctrine.
Under both the doctrine and the character theory shown in Figure 1, the trier of
fact begins at the same starting point, the evidence of the accused's uncharged
crimes. However, when the trier engages in character reasoning, the initial deci-
sion facing the trier is whether to infer from the evidence that the accused has a
personal bad character.90 In contrast, under the doctrine of chances, the trier
need not focus on the accused's subjective character. Under the doctrine of
chances, the initial decision facing the trier is whether the uncharged incidents
are so numerous that it is objectively improbable that so many accidents would
79. Orfinger, supra note 78, at 345-46.
80. Id. at 346-47.
81. Id. at 348.
82. R. PERKINS & R. BoYcE, supra note 69, at 605.
83. Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes Not Charged in the Indictment, 31 OR. L. REv. 267, 270-71
(1951-52).
84. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 69, 3.1-.2; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 69, 830-31.
85. 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
86. Note, Evidence-Proof of Prior Events Admissible Generally and Specifically to Demonstrate Corpus
Delicti Because the Relevance of and Need for the Evidence Outweighed Its Prejudicial Impact, 52 TEX. L Ray.
585 (1973-74).
87. Woods, 484 F.2d at 130.
88. Id. at 133.
89. Id. at 133-34.
90. Turcott, Similar Fact Evidence: The Boardman Legacy, 21 CRIM. L.Q. 43, 46 (1978-79).
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befall the accused.9 1 The decision is akin to the determination the trier must
make in a tort case when the plaintiff relies on res ipsa loquitur. In the tort
setting, the trier must decide whether objectively the most likely cause of the
plaintiff's injury is the defendant's negligent act.92 In the present setting, the
trier must determine whether the more likely cause of the victim's injury is the
act of another human being.
Assume arguendo that statistics compiled by the United States Public
Health Service indicate that during a twenty-five year period, only two percent
of American children experienced an accidental cyanotic episode. Contrast that
figure with the incidence of cyanotic episodes experienced by the children in
Ms. Woods' custody. Suppose, for example, that during the same twenty-five
year period, twenty percent of those children had cyanotic episodes. The fre-
quency of the episodes among those children far exceeds the national average
for such episodes. The episodes are so recurrent among those children that it is
objectively implausible to assume that all those episodes were accidental.93 Ei-
ther one or some of those episodes were caused by human intervention, or Ms.
Woods is one of the most unlucky people alive.9 4
Like the theory of relevance shown in Figure 2, on its face the doctrine of
chances differs from the character evidence theory depicted in Figure 1. More
importantly, unlike the theory shown in Figure 2, the doctrine is distinguishable
from a character reasoning theory in terms of the pertinent policies. The proba-
tive dangers posed by the doctrine differ to a marked degree from the risks
raised by a character theory.
One risk raised by a character theory is that at least at a subconscious
level, the jury will be tempted to punish the accused for uncharged misdeeds.
That risk is acute under a character theory because the theory forces the jury to
concentrate on the accused's personal character or disposition. The jurors must
consciously address the question of the type of person the accused is. There is
no need for the jurors to grapple with that question under the doctrine of
chances. There is an undeniable possibility that on their own motion, the jurors
may advert to the question. However, unlike a character theory, the doctrine of
chances does not compel the jurors to focus on the accused's subjective disposi-
tion.95 Consequently, the nature of the initial inferential step under the doctrine
significantly reduces the risk of a decision on an improper basis.
The second probative danger raised by a character theory is that the jury
will overvalue the probative worth of the item of evidence. Although general
character has only slight98 or small9 7 relevancy to the issue of the accused's
91. Id. at 48-49; Comment, Developments in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 535, 539
(1974).
92. C. MoRIus & C. MoRRIS. TORTS 117-25 (2d ed. 1980); W. KEETON. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORis §§ 39-40 (5th ed. 1984).
93. Comment, supra note 35, at 1225.
94. Elliott, The Young Person's Guide to Similar Fact Evidence-I, 1983 CalM. L. REV. 284, 289.
95. E. IMWINIKELRIED, supra note 4, at § 4:01, at 4-4.
96. 1 B. JEFFERSON. CAMFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK § 21.3 ; Comment, Evidence--Other
Crimes-Balancing Relevance and Need Against Unfair Prejudice to Determine the Admissibility of Other Unex-
plained Deaths as Proof of the Corpus Delicti and the Perpetrator's Identity, 6 RuT.-C.te. L.J. 173, 183-84
(1974-75).
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conduct on a specific occasion, we fear that the jurors will treat character as a
reliable predictor of conduct.98 There is less risk of overestimation of probative
value under the doctrine of chances. The doctrine invites the trier to compare
the accused's experience with statistical data or the trier's knowledge of every-
day, human experience. We commonly accept the trier's knowledge of "the
ways of the world" as a trustworthy basis for legal reasoning. That knowledge is
one of the bases for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine;9  and the jury instructions in
many jurisdictions specifically encourage jurors to employ that knowledge as a
basis for resolving factual disputes. 100
Since the theory of relevance depicted in Figure 3 is distinguishable from
the forbidden theory depicted in Figure 1, prosecutors may properly rely on the
doctrine of chances as a noncharacter theory for satisfying Rule 404(b).' 0 '
However, the courts should not admit uncharged misconduct evidence as a mat-
ter of course whenever the prosecutor asserts that the evidence is relevant under
the doctrine of chances to prove the actus reus. Rather than accepting the pros-
ecutor's argument as ipse dixit, the courts should carefully evaluate the evi-
dence to ensure that the prosecutor has established the factual predicate for
invoking the doctrine. 02 In theory, there is a distinction between character rea-
soning and the use of the doctrine of chances to establish the actus reus. How-
ever, in practice the distinction can be a thin,'10 3 difficult line for the jurors to
draw; while the two doctrines posit different intermediate inferences, under both
doctrines the jurors draw an ultimate inference of conduct. Moreover, the lax
application of the doctrine of chances can eviscerate the character evidence pro-
hibition. Just as every true crime includes a mens rea, an actus reus is an essen-
tial element of each true crime.'0 4 If uncharged misconduct becomes routinely
admissible to prove the actus reus, there will be little left to the prohibition.
Before admitting evidence of the accused's uncharged crimes to establish the
actus under the doctrine of chances, the trial judge must ensure that the prose-
cutor has strictly satisfied the following foundational requirements.
97. Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: Relevancy, Competency, Privileges. Wit-
nesses, Opinion, and Expert Witnesses, 14 TULSA LJ. 227, 271 (1978-79).
98. R. CROSS & N. WILKINS, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 172 (1964).
99. See C. MORRIS & C. MORRIS, supra note 92; see W. KEETON, supra note 92.
100. E.g., 1 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL AND CRIMI-
NAL § 10.01, at 260 (3d ed. 1977)(this instruction tells the jury that in evaluating a witness' credibility, the jurors
consider "the probability or improbability of the witness' statements .... ); 1 L. SAND, J. SIFFERT. W. LOUGHLIN
& S. REISS, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7.01, at 7-4 (1984)("In deciding the question of credibility,
remember that you should use your common sense .... and your experience"). See also United States v. Troop,
890 F. 2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir. 1989) ("fjluries, in reaching their verdicts, are allowed and expected to draw upon
their common sense in evaluating what is reasonable to infer from circumstantial evidence").
101. Comment, supra note 35, at 1227.
102. 1 B. JEFFERSON, supra note 96, at § 21.4.
103. United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1313 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986).
104. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 69, at §§ 3.1-.2; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 69, at 605-
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Figure 3
ITEM OF INTERMEDIATE ULTIMATE
EVIDENCE INFERENCE - INFERENCE
THE ACCUSED'S THE OBJECTIVE AN ACTUS REUS
UNCHARGED ACTS IMPROBABILITY OF
SO MANY LOSSES
BEFALLING THE
ACCUSED
ACCIDENTALLY
Each uncharged incident must be roughly similar to the charged crime. In
the hypothetical at the outset of this article, the prosecutor offered testimony
about the accused's uncharged crime to establish the accused's identity as the
perpetrator of the charged offense. The prosecutor argued that the uncharged
incident was relevant on a noncharacter theory because both crimes evidenced
the same, distinctive modus operandi. When the prosecutor relies on the modus
operandi theory to establish identity, there must be a high degree of similarity
between the charged and uncharged incidents. 10 5 Although the crimes need not
be carbon copies, 10 6 the test is stringent. 0 7 The similarities must be so striking
that they create the inference that all the acts are the handiwork 0 8 of the same
criminal. 09 Assume, for example, a variation of the Woods fact situation. The
body of the victim, who died of cyanosis, was found under a heavy blanket and
several thick pillows. A year earlier another child in the accused's custody died
of cyanosis. However, on the earlier occasion the body was found at the bottom
of a hay stack on the premises. Since the two incidents lack a common "signa-
ture quality"" 0 modus, the judge could not admit testimony about the earlier
incident to show the accused's identity as the perpetrator of the charged offense.
To trigger the doctrine of chances, the uncharged incident must also be
similar to the charged crime."' A dissimilar uncharged incident has at most a
negligible effect on the probability of an accidental occurrence of the social
105. Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 968 (3d Cir. 1980); Shifflet, Admissibility of Evidence Disclosing
Other Crimes, 5 HASTINGS LJ. 73, 75, 76 (1953-54).
106. United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 232 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988).
107. United States v. Lail, 846 F.2d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).
108. United States v. Morano, 697 F.2d 923, 926 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Park, 525 F.2d 1279, 1284 (5th Cir. 1976).
109. Raymond Leslie Morris, 54 CRiM. App. 69, 80 (1970).
110. United States v. Gutierrez, 696 F.2d 753, 755 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 (1983);
United States v. Rappaport, 19 MJ. 708, 713 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984); People v. Alvarez, 44 Cal. App. 3d 375, 383,
118 Cal. Rptr. 602, 606 (1975); Dickey v. State, 646 S.W.2d 232, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Teague, J.,
dissenting); Collazo v. State, 623 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
111. Comment, supra note 35, at 1230, 1234.
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harm."1 2 However, the required degree of similarity is not as great as the degree
necessary to invoke the modus operandi theory.11, 3 Under the doctrine of
chances, it suffices that all the incidents fall into the same general category.11"
In the variation of the Woods case in the preceding paragraph, the earlier cya-
notic episode would probably be admissible to help establish the actus reus. In
both incidents, the cause of death was cyanosis; and it is the objective improba-
bility of so many accidental cyanotic episodes which generates the inference of
an actus reus.
Considering the losses in both the charged and uncharged incidents, the
accused has suffered the loss more frequently than the typical person endures
such losses accidentally. The courts and commentators intuitively recognize
that when the prosecutor resorts to the doctrine of chances, it is highly relevant
to consider the number of losses the accused has suffered. The Woods case is a
classic example of the utilization of the doctrine because the twenty other cya-
notic incidents were so numerous., However, in analyzing the propriety of ap-
plying the doctrine in a particular case, the courts1 ' and commentators1 " have
tended to focus on the absolute size of the number of incidents. The debate is
usually phrased in terms of the question of whether a single uncharged incident
is enough to trigger the doctrine of chances."18
It is submitted that the focus on the absolute size of the number of inci-
dents is wrong-minded. Instead, the courts should consider the relative fre-
quency of the incidents. The most meaningful question is whether cumulatively,
the losses suffered by the accused-the number of cyanotic episodes experienced
by the accused's children or the number of fires at buildings owned by the ac-
cused-exceed the frequency rate for the general population. The total number
of losses must reach an improbability threshold, 19 and the number reaches that
threshold only when the frequency with which the accused suffers the losses is
greater than the general frequency with which such losses occur.
Revisit the Woods fact situation. Assume again that during the relevant
twenty-five year period, only two percent of the children in the United States
experienced cyanotic episodes. During that period, the children in Ms. Woods'
custody had twenty cyanotic incidents. Suppose that there were a total of 100
children in her custody during those twenty-five years. Thus, twenty percent of
the children in the accused's custody experienced cyanotic episodes. The un-
charged incidents are highly probative of an actus reus because the accused's
incidence of losses is several times the frequency for the general population.
112. Id. at 1230.
113. United States v. Baldarrama, 566 F.2d 560, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 844 (1978);
United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847 (1978); Shifflet, supra
note 105, at 76; State v. Ellis: The Other Wrongful Act Rule, Survey of Nebraska Law - Evidence 15 CRasH-
TON L. REV. 281, 288 (1981-82).
114. E. IMWINKELasED, supra note 4, at § 3.11.
115. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
116. State v. Allen, 301 Or. 569, 725 P.2d 331 (1986).
117. Comment, supra note 35, at 1228.
118. See supra notes 116 & 117.
119. Comment, supra note 35, at 1228.
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The key is the relative frequency rather than brute number of incidents.
Vary the facts. Suppose that Ms. Woods had been in charge of a huge orphan-
age during the twenty-five year period. During the twenty-five year period a
total of 3,000 children were in the custodial care of the orphanage. The con-
stant is that during the twenty-five year period, the children in her custody suf-
fered a total of twenty cyanotic episodes. Should the judge admit the uncharged
misconduct evidence in this variation of the Woods case? The answer is No.
The evidence has not attained the improbability threshold. During the same
period two percent of American children experienced cyanotic episodes. Al-
though the absolute size of the number of uncharged incidents-twenty-is im-
pressive, only 1.5 percent of the children in the accused's custody had cyanotic
experiences. The relative frequency of the accused's losses does not make it ob-
jectively improbable that on the occasion of the charged offense, the child's
death resulted from an actus reus.
How can the prosecutor establish the frequency with which the type of loss
involved in the case occurs in the general population? There may be pre-existing
data compilations. Government agencies or private research organizations might
have gathered empirical data, for example, in the form of an epidemiological
study.120 The studies may be so authoritative that the data is judicially noticea-
ble, 121 or the study may fall within the learned treatise exception to the hearsay
rule.122 If the data has not been compiled but it is accessible, the prosecutor can
retain an expert to use recognized statistical techniques to gather the data es-
tablishing the frequency. 23 Failing all other methods, the prosecutor can ask
the judge to rely on her conception of common, human experience to resolve the
question whether the accused suffered the loss more frequently than the typical
person could expect to sustain the loss. This last technique is imprecise. How-
ever, it is the same sort of judgment which the trial judge makes when the
judge must decide whether a modus operandi is so unique that it is probably
the handiwork of a single criminal. In making that decision, the judge rarely
has the benefit of empirical data about the frequency with which a particular
modus is utilized. 24 Yet every jurisdiction allows the judge to rely on common
sense and experience to make that decision.
Of course, as the proponent, the prosecutor has the burden of establishing
all the foundational facts conditioning the admissibility of the uncharged mis-
conduct evidence under the doctrine of chances. 25 At the end of her analysis of
120. Dore, A Proposed Standard for Evaluating the Use of Epidemiologlcal Evidence in Toxic Tort and
other Personal Injury Cases, 28 How. L.J. 677 (1985).
121. Section 201(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "[a] judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is. . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."
122. FED. R. EVID. 803(18); Imwinkelried, The Use of Learned Scientific Treatises Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(18), 18 TRIAL Feb. 1982, at 56.
123. P. GIANNELLU & E. IMWINKELRIED. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 15-4(B) (1986).
124. United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1985) is an exceptional case. In that case, eyewit-
nesses described the bank robber as wearing a bandana. The prosecutor went to the length of presenting an F.B.I.
agent's testimony that of the 1,800 bank robberies in the Los Angeles area during a certain time period, only two
involved persons wearing a bandana.
125. E. IMWINKELEIED, supra note 4, at § 9:49.
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all the foundational testimony the judge may genuinely doubt whether the fre-
quency of the accused's losses exceeds the incidence for the general population.
In that event, the judge has no choice but to exclude the prosecutor's evidence.
If the judge has no satisfactory basis for determining the frequency of such
accidental occurrences among the general populace, the judge may not admit
the uncharged misconduct evidence under the aegis of the doctrine of chances.
The issue of the occurrence of an actus reus must be in bona fide dispute;
the prosecution must have a legitimate need to resort to the uncharged miscon-
duct to prove the actus reus. The first two foundatiolial requirements, mandat-
ing proof of similarity and a frequency of loss exceeding the improbability
threshold, flow from the character evidence prohibition codified in Rule 404(b).
If either requirement is unmet, the prosecutor has not triggered the doctrine of
chances; and the uncharged misconduct evidence does not possess relevance on
a noncharacter theory. The last foundational requirement, though, flows from
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Bare logical relevance on a noncharacter theory is not enough to guarantee
the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence. The evidence must also
pass muster under Rule 403. Rule 403 permits the judge to exclude logically
relevant evidence when the accompanying probative dangers outweigh the pro-
bative value of the evidence. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403 indi-
cates that in assessing the probative value of an item of potentially prejudicial
evidence, the judge ought to consider whether the proponent has a bona fide
need to introduce that item.'
We shall consider the question of the extent of the prosecution's need for
uncharged misconduct evidence in detail in the next subsection devoted to the
use of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove mens rea. We shall defer the in
depth discussion of prosecution need until that subsection, since that subsection
addresses the primary topic of this article, the use of uncharged crimes to estab-
lish intent. However, even an abbreviated discussion of the case law governing
the use of other crimes to prove actus reus must make the point that the prose-
cutor may resort to other crimes evidence for that purpose only when the occur-
rence of the actus reus is in genuine dispute. In a 1990 decision, 127 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made that point in emphatic fashion. The case
was a habeas corpus proceeding based on a state conviction. Like Ms. Woods,
the accused in this case was charged with infanticide. Unlike Ms. Woods, the
accused did not contend that the decedent child suffered the injuries acciden-
tally; as the Ninth Circuit commented, "[i]n the instant case, no claim was
made that the child died accidentally."1 28 Nevertheless, as in Woods, the trial
judge permitted the prosecutor to introduce uncharged misconduct evidence for
the stated reason that the evidence was relevant to prove the actus reus. The
Ninth Circuit not only held that the trial judge erred; the court also ruled that
126. Adv. Comm. Note, FED. R. EviD. 403. ("The availability of other means of proof may also be an
appropriate factor."); S. SALTZBURG, L. ScHINAsi & D. SCHLUETER, supra note 12, at 362 (2d ed. 1986) ("actu-
ally disputed").
127. McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990).
128. Id. at 754.
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the uncharged misconduct evidence was so virulent that the erroneous admission
of the evidence denied the accused due process and rendered the trial funda-
mentally unfair.129 The court emphasized that while highly prejudicial, the evi-
dence had minimal probative value, since the accused had not disputed the issue
of the occurrence of an actus reus."s°
The Ninth Circuit's insistence that the issue be controverted is well taken.
Uncharged misconduct evidence often has dual logical relevance; even when the
evidence is relevant on a noncharacter theory, it also incidentally shows the
accused's bad character. 31 If the charge is infanticide and the uncharged mis-
conduct evidence establishes the death of several other children in the accused's
custody, the criminal disposition inference is patent even when neither the pros-
ecutor nor the judge mentions the inference. If the judge admits uncharged mis-
conduct to prove the actus reus when the evidence has only tenuous'32 probative
value for that purpose, there is a significant risk that the jurors will misuse the
evidence by drawing the forbidden character inference. 33 Unless the prosecu-
tion has a bona fide need to use the evidence to prove the occurrence of an actus
reus, the predominant effect"' on the jurors' minds may be to "serve mostly to
demonstrate that the Defendant had the propensity to commit the crime
charged, the one impermissible use of such evidence."" 51
B. The Use of the Doctrine of Chances to Prove the Mens Rea
In criminal law, conduct can be "accidental" in two, very different senses.
As subsection A explained, conduct can be accidental in the sense that the con-
duct does not represent an actus reus. A social loss such as a death can occur
without the causal intervention of another human being; the death may be the
result of "an act of God" such as an earthquake or flood." 86 As the Woods case
illustrates,"37 when the accused claims that the conduct in question was acciden-
tal in this fundamental sense, the prosecutor may sometimes legitimately offer
uncharged misconduct evidence under the doctrine of chances to negate the
claim.
There is a second sense in which allegedly criminal conduct can be acci-
dental. The accused may admit that he performed the actus reus but claim that
he did so with an innocent state of mind." 8 For example, the accused may
concede that he had possession of a contraband drug but deny that he knew
129. Id.
130. Id. The earlier opinion in McGuire appears at 873 F.2d 1323. See also People v. Spoto, No. 88SC611
(Colo., July 9, 1990)(WESTLAW, States library, Colorado file).
131. See Note, Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Offenses in Criminal Prosecutions in West Virginia, 54
W. VA. L. REV. 142 (1951).
132. Johnson, The Admissibility of Evidence of Extraneous Offenses in Texas Criminal Trials, 14 S. Tax.
LJ. 69, 74 (1973).
133. Z. COWEN & P. CARTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 120-23 (1956); Carter, The Admissibility
of Evidence of Similar Facts, 69 LAW Q. REV. 80, 92 (1953).
134. United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 204 (10th Cir. 1972); Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions
of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMoRY LJ. 135, 147 (1989).
135. United States v. Anthony, 712 F.Supp. 112, 117 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
136. R, PERKINS & R. BoYcE, supra note 69, at 610.
137. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
138. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 69, at § 5.1.
1990]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
that the substance was an illegal drug; he might testify that he thought that the
substance was a lawful medicine. 18 9 Or an accused might admit that he received
stolen property but defend on the theory that he was unaware that the property
was stolen. 4 0 In this context, when the accused characterizes the conduct as
"accidental," the accused means that he performed the act without the required
mens rea.
Just as the government may offer evidence of the accused's other crimes to
disprove "accident" in the first sense, the prosecutor may attempt to introduce
uncharged misconduct evidence to negate "accident" in the second sense.'
Dean Wigmore proposed the following hypothetical to exemplify this use of un-
charged misconduct evidence:
[I]f A while hunting with B hears the bullet from B's gun whistling past his head, he
is willing to accept B's bad aim. . . as a conceivable explanation; but if shortly after-
wards the same thing happens again, and if on the third occasion A receives B's bullet
in his body, the immediate inference (i.e., as a probability, perhaps not as a certainty)
is that B shot at A deliberately; because the chances of an inadvertent shooting on
three successive similar occasions are extremely small; or (to put it another way) be-
cause inadvertence or accident is only an abnormal or occasional explanation for the
discharge of a gun at a given object, and therefore the recurrence of a similar result
(i.e., discharge towards the same object, A) excludes the fair possibility of such an
abnormal cause and points out the cause as probably a more natural and usual one,
i.e., a deliberate discharge at A. In short, similar results do not usually occur through
abnormal causes; and the recurrence of a similar result . . . tends (increasingly with
each instance) to negative . . . inadvertence . . . or good faith or other innocent
mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the
presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act; and the force
of each additional instance will vary in each kind of offense according to the
probability that the act could be repeated, within a limited time and under given cir-
cumstances, with an innocent intent .1
2
Essentially, Dean Wigmore relies on the theory of logical relevance de-
picted in Figure 4. Like the theory shown in Figure 3, this theory enables the
jury to reason about the case without relying on any forbidden inferences about
the accused's subjective, personal character. As under Figure 3, the intermedi-
ate inference in this theory is a conclusion about the objective improbabilityl"
of the accused's innocent involvement in so many similar incidents such as in-
stances of possession of contraband drugs or receipts of stolen property.
139. United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Greenwood, 6 C.M.A.
209, 215-16, 19 C.M.R. 335, 341-42 (1955).
140. R. PERKINS & R. BoYcE, supra note 69, at 394-405.
141. Comment, Admission of Evidence of Other Misconduct in Washington to Prove Intent or Absence of
Mistake or Accident: The Logical Inconsistencies of Evidence Rule 404(b), 61 WASH. L. Rsv. 1213, 1226-27
(1986).
142. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 302, at 241 (1979).
143. Ordover, supra note 134, at 168.
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Figure 4
ITEM OF INTERMEDIATE ULTIMATE
EVIDENCE INFERENCE INFERENCE
THE ACCUSED'S THE OBJECTIVE THE MENS REA
UNCHARGED ACTS IMPROBABILITY OF
THE ACCUSED'S
INNOCENT INVOLVEMENT
IN SO MANY
INCIDENTS
However, like the theory depicted in Figure 3, this theory can easily be
abused. As Section II noted, intent is an essential element of every true
crime."44 Whenever the prosecutor has evidence of an uncharged crime similar
to the charged offense, the prosecutor can attempt to invoke Wigmore's doctrine
of chances; the prosecutor can always argue that a similar uncharged crime
triggers the doctrine of chances and is, therefore, logically relevant on a
noncharacter theory both to disprove accident and thereby to prove mens rea. If
the courts accept these arguments uncritically, the prosecutor may be able to
introduce bad character evidence in disguise."4 5 Unfortunately, as one commen-
tator has already observed, 14 there is mounting evidence that the courts have
tended to be too receptive to prosecutors' invocation of the doctrine of chances
to prove mens rea.4 7
To counter this tendency, the courts should clearly enunciate and rigor-
ously enforce the foundational requirements applicable when the prosecutor re-
lies on the doctrine of chances to establish mens rea. The requirements parallel
the foundational requirements for invoking the doctrine to prove the actus reus.
Each uncharged incident must be roughly similar to the charged crime. To
bring the doctrine into play, the prosecutor must show that the uncharged inci-
dent is similar to the charged offense. As Dean Wigmore emphasized in the
analysis of his famous hypothetical, the facts give rise to an inference of mens
rea because "the chances of an inadvertent shooting on three successive similar
occasions are extremely small ... ."I'l It flies in the face of common sense to
assume that on all three occasions, the accused had an innocent state of
144. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 69, at §§ 3.1, 3.4-.5, 3.8; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 69,
at 826-40 (3d ed. 1982).
145. Ordover, supra note 134, at 168.
146. Id.
147. In Harvey v. State, 604 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1979), the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed a criminal
conviction because the trial judge permitted the prosecution to introduce uncharged misconduct evidence to dis-
prove accident and establish mens rea even though the accused did not defend on the basis of lack of mens rea.
148. 2 J. WIGMOR, supra note 142, § 302, at 241 (1979).
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mind; 49  a coincidence of three, inadvertent, similar acts is objectively
unlikely. 50
In several respects, this foundational requirement tracks the corresponding
requirement which the prosecutor must satisfy when the government relies on
the doctrine of chances to prove the actus reus. The degree of similarity be-
tween the charged and uncharged incidents need not be as great as the degree
required when the prosecutor relies on the modus operandi theory to prove
identity.'"'
Further, under both applications of the doctrine of chances, the prosecutor
must demonstrate that the physical elements of the charged and uncharged of-
fenses are similar. 52 The earlier discussion of the Woods case pointed out that
the charged and uncharged incidents were sufficiently similar to trigger the doc-
trine of chances because all the incidents involved the same medical condition,
cyanosis. 15' While the physical elements must be similar, 54 the courts apply the
similarity requirement laxly. Suppose, for example, that the accused is charged
with knowing possession of heroin and defends on the basis that he was unaware
that the substance in his possession was a contraband drug. In all likelihood, the
court would permit the prosecutor to introduce testimony about uncharged inci-
dents in which the accused was found in possession of marijuana' 55 or amphet-
amines. 56 In short, the physical elements of the charged and uncharged events
need not be identical. 157
The courts are less tolerant of dissimilarities between the victims of the
charged and uncharged incidents. 58 When the charged crime is a sexual offense
against a young girl, the judge may exclude prosecution testimony about an
uncharged offense against a boy. 59 If the charged offense is a sexual offense
against a child, the judge may bar evidence of an uncharged crime against an
adult. 60 In a case charging an assault on a police officer, the judge may well
sustain a defense objection to evidence of uncharged attacks on private per-
sons.' 6 ' The courts should insist that the victims be similar when the prosecutor
offers uncharged misconduct evidence under the doctrine of chances to prove
149. United States v. Semak, 536 F.2d 1142, 1145 (6th Cir. 1976).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 20 M.J. 806 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985); People v. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d
867, 755 P. 2d 355, 248 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1988), cert. denied sub. nom., Robbins v. California, 109 S. Ct. 849
(1989).
152. Comment, supra note 141, at 1230-31. See also State v. Pratt, 309 Or. 205, 785 P.2d 350 (1990).
153. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
154. Roth, Understanding Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts: A Diagrammatic Approach, 9 PEPPERDINE L
REv. 297, 310 (1982). See also Case Note, Evidence: Prior Crimes Used to Show Specific Intent and Identity, 50
MARQ. L. REv. 133, 134 (1966).
155. United States v. Skramstad, 649 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1981).
156. United States v. Parkison, 417 F.Supp. 730 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
157. See generally Note, Evidence-Admissibility of Other Crimes, 18 WAKE FoREsr L. REv. 571, 582
(1982).
158. Comment, supra note 141, at 1230.
159. Garza v. State, 632 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Crim, App. 1982).
160. Comment, supra note 141, at 1230. See also People v. Spoto, No. 88SC611 (Colo., July 9, 1990)
(WESTLAW, States library, Colorado file).
161. United States v. Jaqua, 485 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. San Martin, 505 F.2d
918 (5th Cir. 1974).
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mens rea. The focus is the accused's state of mind. The accused's intent may
vary with the victim's identity. The accused may have radically different atti-
tudes toward different groups of persons, and the trier can infer wrongful intent
much more confidently if the accused has victimized the same type of person on
other occasions.
Considering the accused's involvement in both the charged and uncharged
incidents, the accused has been involved in such events more frequently than
the typical person. Proof of similarity between the charged and uncharged inci-
dents is a necessary condition to invoking the doctrine of chances. However,
standing alone, proof of similarity is insufficient to bring the doctrine into play.
Another necessary condition is proof that the accused has been involved in simi-
lar incidents so often that it is objectively unlikely that he became involved
innocently. This foundational requirement is obviously similar to the second
foundational requirement applicable when the prosecutor relies on the doctrine
of chances to prove the occurrence of an actus reus. In applying both require-
ments, the judge must engage in relative frequency analysis. However, the re-
quirements differ in kind and degree, and the differences may make it more
difficult for the prosecution to satisfy this foundational requirement when the
issue is the accused's mens rea.
The requirements for the two applications of the doctrine of chances differ
in kind because the application determines the nature of the frequency the
judge must analyze. When the prosecutor invites the court to apply the doctrine
to prove the actus reus, the focus is on the frequency of a particular type of
loss-the death of a child in a person's custody or the fire at a person's building.
In contrast, when the prosecutor asks the court to employ the doctrine to estab-
lish mens rea, the relevant frequency is the incidence of the accused's personal
involvement in a type of event-the discharge of a weapon in Wigmore's hypo-
thetical, the possession of contraband drugs, or the receipt of stolen property.
To intelligently decide whether the prosecutor's evidence exceeds the objective
improbability threshold,"6 2 the judge must define the correct relative frequency.
The difference in kind between the foundational requirements under the
two applications of the doctrine of chances results in a further difference in
degree. The requirements differ in the practical degree of difficulty of proving
the relevant frequencies. There are many empirical studies documenting the in-
cidence of social losses such as cyanotic episodes, deaths caused by asphyxia-
tion, and fires. Quite apart from the utility of this data to judges struggling with
the application of the doctrine of chances, there are other important social rea-
sons for collecting the data. Many of these data collections play a critical role in
medical diagnosis. Other data collections are useful to businesses such as insur-
ance companies. In a given case, it may be relatively easy for the prosecutor to
marshall the frequency data needed to satisfy the foundational requirement ap-
plicable when the question is the occurrence of the actus reus.
However, it is far more difficult to find the relevant frequency data when
the question is the existence of the mens rea. There may be little or no data on
162. Comment, supra note 141, at 1227.
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such questions as how often the typical citizen is likely to be found in possession
of contraband drugs or stolen property. The judge is more likely to have to rely
on her common sense and knowledge of human experience. The extent of the
judge's pertinent knowledge may be an intuitive belief that the inadvertent pos-
session of illicit drugs or stolen property is probably a "once in a lifetime" expe-
rience for an innocent person. Thus, there is ordinarily more conjecture when
the prosecutor invokes the doctrine of chances to prove mens rea-all the more
reason, of course, to employ the doctrine cautiously. As when the prosecutor
relies on the doctrine of chances to prove the actus reus, the burden of proving
the preliminary facts rests on the prosecutor.1 8 If after weighing all the founda-
tional testimony the judge believes that it would be speculative to find that the
prosecution has attained the improbability threshold, the judge should exclude
the uncharged misconduct evidence.
The issue of the existence of the mens rea must be in bona fide dispute;
the prosecution must have a legitimate need to resort to the uncharged miscon-
duct evidence to prove intent. Subsection A observed that uncharged miscon-
duct offered to prove the actus reus must pass muster under Federal Rule 403
as well as under Rule 404(b). 164 The same observation obtains when the prose-
cution attempts to introduce evidence of the accused's other crimes to establish
the mens rea. The prosecution must have a bona fide need to resort to the po-
tentially prejudicial uncharged misconduct evidence.' 65 To assess the extent of
the prosecution need, the judge must painstakingly evaluate the state of the
record when the prosecutor offers the evidence. There are four possible varia-
tions of the state of the record.
In one variation, the accused has already affirmatively disputed the issue of
the existence of the mens rea. There are several ways in which the accused
could do so. During opening statement, 66 the defense attorney might assert that
at the time of the actus reus, the accused had an innocent state of mind. The
accused 6 7 or a defense witness 68 may give testimony calling into question the
existence of the mens rea. If a prosecution witness' testimony points to the exis-
tence of the mens rea, a pointed cross-examination by the defense attorney
could serve to place intent in doubt.' 69 The common denominator in these cases
is that intent is more than a purely formal issue. The accused is actively con-
testing7 0 the intent issue. All courts agree that this state of the record warrants
163. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, § 9:49 (1984).
164. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
165. S. SALTZBURG, L. ScHiNAsI & D. SCHLUETER, supra note 12, at 362 ("actually disputed"). See also
United States v. Brooks, 22 M.J. 441 (C.M.A. 1986); United States v. Rappaport, 22 M.J. 445 (C.M.A. 1986).
166. United States v. Badolato, 710 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Olsen, 589 F.2d 351 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Cohen, 489 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir. 1973).
167. United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1979). See also
Comment, Defining Standards for Determining the Admissibility of Evidence of Other Sex Offenses, 25 UCLA
L. REv. 261, 277 (1977).
168. People v. Nible, 200 Cal. App. 3d 838, 246 Cal. Rptr. 119, 247 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1988).
169. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, at § 8:14 (1984).
170. United States v. Kaiser, 545 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (5th
Cir. 1973); Bunch v. State, 605 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. 1980); Elliott, The Young Person's Guide to Similar Fact
Evidence-I, 1983 Cium. L. REv. 284, 292, 296 (1983).
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the receipt of otherwise admissible uncharged misconduct evidence to establish
mens rea.
Now shift to the variation at the polar extreme. Assume that the parties
have entered into a formal stipulation as to the existence of intent.' 7 ' The ac-
cused might have decided to defend on a theory other than lack of mens rea. If
the accused and the prosecution stipulate to the existence of the intent, the stip-
ulation effectively removes the mens rea issue from the range of dispute in the
case. In this state of the record, all courts agree that unless the uncharged mis-
conduct evidence is relevant to another issue, the evidence is inadmissible to
prove intent.
While it is easy to determine the proper outcome in the first two variations
of the state of the record, the next two variations are troublesome.
In the third variation, although there is no formal stipulation, the accused
informally concedes the mens rea issue. There might be several reasons why the
accused would be willing to informally concede intent absent a formal stipula-
tion. In many jurisdictions, the accused cannot compel the prosecution to enter
into a stipulation.17 2 Even if the accused offered to formally stipulate, the prose-
cution might reject the offer. Or the defense might be reluctant to enter into a
formal stipulation. Suppose, for instance, that the accused intended to defend on
an alibi or misidentification theory. 173 Even though the accused does not con-
template contesting the intent element of the crime, the accused might be leary
of stipulating that whoever committed the actus reus possessed the requisite
mens rea. Unless the judge clearly explains the law governing stipulations,'174 a
juror might suspect that any accused who knew enough about the crime to stip-
ulate to the mens rea must have been personally involved in the crime. The
juror might not realize that evidence law permits parties to stipulate to the exis-
tence of facts which they lack personal knowledge of.
In this light, the accused may well find herself in a situation in which she is
willing to informally concede the existence of mens rea. Assume that the de-
fense counsel assures'75 the trial judge that during both opening statements and
closing argument, the defense counsel will expressly state that as far as the
defense can tell, the perpetrator of the charged crime possessed the required
mens rea. The defense counsel also assures the judge that the defense will not
object if the judge mentions and highlights the informal concession during the
final jury charge.'17  If the defense makes and lives up to these assurances, the
171. There is currently a sharp split of authority among the courts over the question of whether the accused
can force the prosecution to enter into a stipulation as to the existence of an ultimate fact in the case. E. IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 4, at § 8:11 (1984). An analysis of that split of authority is beyond the scope of this
Article.
172. E. IMWINKELPIED, supra note 4, at § 8:11 (1984).
173. Id. at § 8:13.
174. See generally E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTARY FOUNDATIONS 307-12 (2d ed. 1989).
175. If the defense attorney reneges on the assurance during summation, the prosecution may move to reopen
the evidence. People v. Tassel, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 83 n.3, 679 P.2d 1, 4 n.3, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570 n.3 (1984).
176. In many states, the trial judge has lost the common-law power to comment on the evidence. H. KALVEN
& H. ZESEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 418-21 (1971). It would not constitute "comment" for the judge to merely
mention the defense's informal concession; even in jurisdictions barring judicial comment on the weight of the
evidence, the judge may sum up. Id. However, the judge should go beyond merely summarizing the state of the
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trial judge should exclude any uncharged misconduct testimony offered to prove
mens rea. It is true that there is still a chance that the jurors could acquit for
want of evidence of intent. However, given the defense concessions and the judi-
cial comment, it would be highly irrational for the jurors to do so. Realistically,
the possibility is so remote that it does not justify exposing the accused to the
much livelier possibility that the jury will misuse the testimony as general bad
character evidence. On balance, the judge should rule the uncharged miscon-
duct evidence inadmissible in this variation.
In the last variation of the state of the record, although the accused explic-
itly defends on another theory such as alibi or misidentification, the accused is
unwilling to even informally concede the mens rea.17 The defense attorney may
want to leave open the possibility that the jury will acquit for lack of evidence
of intent. The defense attorney might be especially tempted to follow this tack
when the charge requires a special mens rea element and the jury instruction on
the mens rea element seems to impose an onerous burden on the prosecution.
In this variation, the prosecution should generally be entitled to introduce
otherwise admissible uncharged misconduct evidence to establish the mens rea.
When the prosecutor is relying on the doctrine of chances to prove mens rea
rather than the actus reus, there may be little admissible evidence of the mens
rea other than uncharged crimes evidencing the same intent.
The actus reus is a social loss caused by human agency. 178 There is often
readily available physical evidence of the loss itself. In a homicide prosecution,
a forensic pathologist can describe the body and authenticate photographs of
the cadaver. Moreover, the prosecution may have expert testimony attesting
that the loss was caused by human agency. Based on the wound pattern on the
cadaver, the pathologist can opine that the manner of death was homicidalY.7
In contrast, in the typical case in which the prosecutor attempts to estab-
lish the mens rea, the prosecutor may have little alternative evidence. In rare
cases, the prosecutor is fortunate; the prosecutor has evidence that shortly
before, during, or shortly after the crime the accused made statements reflecting
the mens rea. However, more commonly, the prosecutor has no evidence of such
statements. Worse still, the prosecutor often has no physical evidence or expert
testimony. The prosecutor may be able to prove a death by producing a photo-
graph of the cadaver, but no camera is capable of capturing and recording the
mens rea of intent to kill. Further, the courts are more reluctant to admit testi-
mony about mens rea by mental health experts than testimony about manner of
death by forensic pathologists. 180 There has been extensive criticism of expert
testimony by psychiatrists and psychologists.18' There is widespread skepticism
record. The judge should tell the jury that there is no real dispute over the existence of the mens rea. Since the
prohibition of judicial comment is designed to protect the accused, the accused should be deemed competent to
waive the prohibition.
177. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, at §§ 8:13, 8:15.
178. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
179. P. GIANNELU & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 123, § 19-10(B), at 750-52.
180. See generally P. GIANNELU & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 123, Ch. 9.
181. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1967)(Bazelon, C. J.); Burger, Psychia-
trists, Lawyers and the Courts, 28 FBD. PROBATION 3, 7 (June 1964); Shell, Psychiatric Testimony: Science or
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about the ability of mental health experts to retrospectively determine an ac-
cused's state of mind. In part due to that skepticism, in 1984 Congress amended
Federal Rule of Evidence 704 to add the following language:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defend-
ant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant
did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime
or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.a82
It is true that the prosecutor can invite the jury to infer the mens rea from
the percipient witnesses' testimony describing the evidently rational, calculating
manner in which the perpetrator committed the actus reus.85 In an exceptional
case, that inference might be virtually conclusive evidence of an accompanying
criminal intent.1 84 However, that inference may be the prosecutor's only evi-
dence of intent other than any available uncharged misconduct testimony. The
prosecutor typically has many more evidentiary options when she endeavors to
prove the actus reus. Apart from the uncharged misconduct testimony, there
may be a dearth of evidence usable to establish mens rea.
In addition, if the defense refuses to concede the existence of mens rea and
the judge nevertheless excludes the prosecution's uncharged misconduct evi-
dence probative of intent, the jury instructions may make it very difficult for the
prosecution to sustain its burden of proof. Absent a defense concession, the
judge will have to charge the jury on the essential elements of the crime, includ-
ing the mens rea. There is substantial authority that even absent an express
defense request, the trial judge has a sua sponte obligation to instruct the jury
on the elements of the charged offense.28 5 We must assume that the jurors will
be attentive to the instructions and apply them conscientiously. On that assump-
tion, there is a good possibility that the jury will acquit for want of evidence of
intent. When the question is the existence of the mens rea, the prosecutor ordi-
narily has a much more compelling need to resort to probative uncharged mis-
conduct evidence. If the accused does not at least informally concede the exis-
tence of the mens rea, the prosecutor should presumptively 88 be entitled to
introduce evidence of similar, sufficiently frequent uncharged incidents to prove
intent under the doctrine of chances.
Fortune-Telling?, BARRISTER 8 (Fall 1980). See also ZISKiN, The Importance of Hard Data to Software Tech-
niques, in SCIENnnIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 1097, 1100-02 (2d ed. 1981).
182. FED. R. EvID. 704(b). See Note, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence
704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. Rav. 620 (1987).
183. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, § 8:20 (1984).
184. See Comment, supra note 141, at 1221-22, 1223-25. Suppose, for example, that a hidden surveillance
camera happened to videotape a murder on a business premises. The film shows the perpetrator load the weapon,
hide in wait for the victim, shoot the victim three times, poke the body to ensure that the victim was dead, and fire
a final shot for good measure. Viewing the film, any juror in his or her right mind would conclude that the
perpetrator possessed the intent to kill at the time of the actus reus.
185. E.g., People v. Geiger, 35 Cal. 3d 510, 674 P.2d 1303, 199 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1984); People v. Wickersham,
32 Cal. 3d 307, 650 P.2d 311, 185 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1982). Cf. People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963).
186. It is arguable that even absent a defense concession, the uncharged misconduct evidence should be
inadmissible when the testimony about the actus reus almost conclusively demonstrates the existence of the mens
rea. See supra note 183. However, such cases will be extremely rare.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Following the example of the United Kingdom,1 8 7 our courts may one day
relax the character evidence prohibition in criminal cases. Distinguished Ameri-
can commentators have called for that relaxation. 188 However, at least for the
interim, the American courts seem determined to adhere to the conventional
prohibition.
If we are to continue to make any pretense of enforcing the prohibition, we
must repudiate both of the doctrines discussed in this Article. The character
evidence prohibition is violated when we permit a prosecutor to rely on the the-
ory depicted in Figure 2 to justify the admissibility for uncharged misconduct
evidence. As Section II of this Article hopefully demonstrated, that theory of
admissibility is character evidence pure and simple.1 89 While the theory differs
cosmetically from traditional character reasoning, the theory squarely poses
both of the probative dangers inspiring the character evidence prohibition. If
the prosecutor's only argument for the admission of uncharged misconduct evi-
dence is that theory of logical relevance, the prohibition mandates the exclusion
of the evidence.
The rejection of the theory depicted in Figure 2 will give prosecutors even
more incentive to resort to the doctrine of objective chances. As Section III
noted, a doctrine of chances theory possesses legitimate, noncharacter relevance.
However, the theory is susceptible to abuse. The distinction between a verboten
character theory and a permissible chances theory is a thin line 90 which a lay
juror could easily lose sight of. To guard against that risk, the courts should
rigorously enforce the foundational requirements for triggering the doctrine of
chances. The courts should admit uncharged misconduct evidence under the
doctrine to prove mens rea only when the prosecutor can make persuasive show-
ings that each uncharged incident is similar to the charged offense and that the
accused has been involved in such incidents more frequently than the typical
person. The prosecutor's uncharged misconduct testimony must satisfy both
foundational requirements to ensure genuine noncharacter relevance under Rule
187. In Regina v. Boardman, 1975 App. Cas. 421, the House of Lords decided to relax the rigid character
evidence prohibition. The Lords concluded that the difference between character and noncharacter theories of
logical relevance is largely a difference of degree. Lord Cross argued that in a given case, an act of uncharged
misconduct might have so much probative value---even on a character theory-that it would be an affront to
common sense to exclude testimony about the misconduct. However, the Lords made it clear that the uncharged
crime must have extraordinary probative value on a character theory to warrant admissibility. In the great major-
ity of criminal cases, English courts still find character evidence inadequately probative. See also Carter, Forbid-
den Reasoning Permissible: Similar Fact Evidence a Decade After Boardman, 48 MODERN L. REv. 29 (1985).
"Like Banquo's ghost," the distinction between character and noncharacter theories "reappears to demand atten-
tion" in English law. Allan, Similar Fact Evidence and Disposition: Law Discretion, and Admissibility, 48 Moo-
ERN L. REv. 253, 263 (1985).
188. See Hutton, Commentary: Prior Bad Acts Evidence in Cases of Sexual Contact with a Child, 34 S.D.
L. REv. 604 (1989); Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IowA
L. REv. 777 (1981); Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the
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404(b). Even if the prosecutor can surmount the similarity and relative fre-
quency hurdles, the judge should exclude the evidence under Rule 403 unless
the intent issue is in bona fide dispute.
Intellectual honesty demands the repudiation of both of the doctrines cur-
rently threatening to engulf the character evidence prohibition. If we are going
to modify or abolish the prohibition, it should be done explicitly in a straightfor-
ward fashion-not by legerdemain.

